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Abstract 
This paper argues in favour of considering humour and laughter as embodied signs of the 
ancient, sympathetic, figurative mode of the human mind, still working with us in dance, 
music, singing and literary activity. Starting from steady evolutionary provisos, both the 
continuity and the departing lines between nonhuman vocalisations and human laughter are 
considered. Along the Duchenne and non-Duchenne expression types, we analyse the 
developmental extension of laughter, both social and cognitive, probably under complex 
imitative forms through millennia until the emergence of articulated languages. Then, we try 
to explain the particular attachment of humour and laughter to evolutionary achievements in 
the symbolic domain. Thus, from a cognitive and semiotic framework, here it is argued that 
the old signal of play and joy might have evolved on a par with full connectivity and 
unbounded associations promoted by symbolic activity, clinging to new meanings and 
abilities, but still governed by the conjoined social work of sanction and solidarity, a pattern 
that humour shows all over around. As a particular reflex of ancient multimodality, laughter 
(with humour) seems akin to participative, mythical modes of thinking that were in full force 
and effect at the beginning of human societies, rooted in metaphors and figurativeness. Since 
both humour and laughter still find their way in the contemporary contexts of free 
associations, human projections and extended agentivity, they could be properly considered 
as the embodied, old counterpart of the imaginative dimension of symbolic activity. 
Keywords: evolution, mind, laughter, semiotics, figurativeness. 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to explore the idea that both laughter and humour can be viewed 
as remnants or traces signalling the long haul of evolution of human language and mind. As 
far as laughter is concerned, researchers have championed its link with prelinguistic origins 
and primate expressions of joy and play (Deacon 1992; Provine 2000; Davila Ross et al. 
2009; 2010). Humour, on the contrary, has been recently examined on a rationalistic basis 
even if evolutionary arguments enter into consideration (cf. Hurley et al. 2011). Trying to 
overturn this tendency, in this paper, it is argued that humour is an early manifestation of the 
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imaginative function of the mind, attached to the old reflex of laughter, and so imprinted in 
the ancient, physical, embodied networks that compound the body and the mind. 
The idea that the human mind evolved from an original, poetic and mythic stance 
attributing animated properties to the world, as is commonly described by anthropologists 
(Bateson 1972; Leach 1976), implies that clear-cut categories and logical classifications have 
found their way for particular actions among this primary breeding ground of metaphors, 
figuration and connectivity. Some of the research about the evolution of the mind assumes 
the consequences of considering human mind and society as produced by a long path of 
changes and discoveries, including the way the mind presents itself through narrative and 
metaphorical speech and the appearance the world takes through religion and ritual (Donald 
1991; Mithen 1996). Usually, evolutionary research tends to obviate these aspects and 
focuses on naturalistic issues (Dunbar & Barrett 2007) or is rightly devoted to evolutionary 
dilemmas (Tomasello 2014). However, from a cognitive and semiotic approach, which 
assumes that mind is a product and also produces content and meaning, the idea of a set of 
initial stages of metaphorical and figurative thinking has been fruitfully explored (Danesi 
1993; Turner 1997; Wildgen 2004; Turner 2006; Zlatev 2012). Of course, as is frequently 
pointed out (Turner 1997; 2006), these ancient capacities remain with us, have mutated in 
meaningful ways and keep their creative power in dance, music, singing, literary works, 
cinema and new media. The ubiquity of imagination and fantasy today and its myriad of 
aspects and uses should not be an obstacle to consider seriously the import of figurativeness 
in early stages of the mind. If old myths (considered as a conjunction of literature and the 
sacred) are still eloquent enough, it is because they were ancient forms of order and meaning, 
ways of the mind to cope with the world, before (and besides) the spread of writing and the 
more rational attempts to understanding nature. The human mind presumably took off by 
overproducing signals, and thus ambiguity and figuration must be taken as crucial definitory 
features (Viana 2015). 
The thesis of this paper tries to situate humour and laughter in the old scenery of 
figurativeness, connectivity and participation. Here it will be argued that humour and laughter 
are vestiges of early stages of hominisation, when an ancient bodily reflex surpassed its uses 
and readjusted to encompass social ridicule and incongruity, to finally be rewired or rerouted 
to highlight unlimited associations in the symbolic domain, and thus echoing the 
participative, figurative stages of the human mind. As Bateson (1985) remarked, the value of 
humour, related to insight and creativity, has kept growing as it stuck to a variety of forms of 
knowledge and, far from disappearing in the course of evolution and history, we nowadays 
find it pervading many different dimensions and domains of society. By dating it back to the 
old scenery, humour may be approached as a form of creativity still with us, like literature, 
music or dance, but unlike these manifestations, it still may be viewed as composing an overt 
unmistakable embodied sign in its connection with laughter.  
However, there is not a one-to-one relationship between laughter and humour (Provine 
2000; Chafe 2007), since laughter exceeds humour and vice versa, and so here it is 
methodologically assumed a) that laughter, as a prelinguistic human call, linked to play and 
joy, preceded symbolic activity (Deacon 1997), and b) that forms of humour, enabled by 
social sanction (i.e. ridicule) and incongruity, presumably developed through imitation and 
behavioural alignment long before the emergence of articulated languages (Gervais & Wilson 
2005). Then, it can be inferred that laughter, whose respiratory patterns were conducive to 
assimilating laughter and speech, and humour (via incongruity and ridicule) fruitfully 
coevolved with symbolic activity, although keeping their separate paths that allow us to 
distinguish social, imitative smiling and laughter from spontaneous outbursts of laughter, and 
still from humour as a cognitive dimension implying incongruity and belittlement, as we shall 
see in the following pages. Nevertheless, we are very conscious that in order to achieve a 
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sound result on the evolutionary paths of laughter and humour more evidence is needed, and 
so our hypothesis must be certainly tentative, until converging evidence from other sources 
(i.e. developmental and gestural data, evidence from sign languages) can be found.  
 In order to carry our argument forward, in the following sections we examine a) laughter 
in evolutionary perspective, including multimodality, its coevolution with vocal calls, 
Duchenne & Non-Duchenne laughter and their extension through imitation processes; b) 
social and cognitive issues concerning humour, as enabled by incongruity and social sanction, 
and its coevolution with the symbolic dimension via extended connectivity, by means of 
contact and similitude; and c) the structural conditions that link humour and its partially 
convergent bodily sign, laughter, to figurativeness, dreaming and creativity, as properties of 
the original mind; and their persistence and pervasiveness in the contemporary contexts of 
free association, human projections and extended agentivity. 
2. Evolutionary issues 
2.1. Multimodality preceded articulated languages 
There is a certain agreement in contemporary research about the precedence and the 
ubiquitous role of multimodality in human evolution (Deacon 1997; Corballis 2003; 
Tomasello 2008; Fitch 2010). Multimodal semiotics, including a variety of vocal calls, has 
presumably shaped hominid life during millennia, before the quasi-autonomous forms of 
spoken language emerged. If we look for pragmatic and multimodal signals in everyday 
conversation, so the argument goes, we could grasp a little bit of how early communication, 
prior to autonomous linguistic skills, might have been: recall the different pointing systems, a 
huge variety of hand abilities (including working, counting and signing abilities), 
paralinguistic signals (including face interpretation), shouting and intended intonation, the 
social meaning of objects, clothes and commodities, iconicity and mimicry. Gestures, objects 
and the body have probably been the fertile land from where metaphorical and metonymical 
information have been extracted (Corballis 2003; Tomasello 2008). But we cannot but think 
that multimodality also included a variety of vocal abilities. As Deacon (1997: 355-356) has 
argued, although vocal skills were limited, they presumably existed side by side with gestures 
for almost 2 million years, and thus both dimensions are supposed to coevolve, developing 
complex relationships. In this respect, the pragmatically-oriented research carried out by 
Scott-Phillips (2014), assuming what he calls an ostensive-inferential model for the evolution 
of language and cognition, represents a positive contribution in order to understand how these 
complex levels of evolutionary integration may have worked. 
The argument of coevolution tends to give support to two different phases of hominid 
evolution, well attested in the fossil record, from homo habilis to homo ergaster, and from 
homo ergaster to homo sapiens, covering a range of 2.5 million years. During the first phase, 
basic bipedal abilities linked to manual work are usually described, while the second phase 
implies more elaborated handwork, presumably social abilities, maybe singing and more 
functional vocal calls, an extended multimodality, hunting strategies and likely some degree 
of fire and dwelling expertise (Mithen 1996; Fitch 2010). The issue of singing is particularly 
interesting because it relates vocal skills to social, imaginative and emotional dimensions in a 
way that has been considered as a precursor (even, a parallel one) to articulated language 
competence (Mithen 2005; Fitch 2010: 466-507). If we consider laughter as a specific human 
call (as well as sobbing; see section 2.2), we should place its origin in continuity with early 
Australopithecine calls, clearly preceding more elaborate vocal abilities. 
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The same degree of consensus seems to have been achieved in regard to the expansion of 
articulated languages, although scholars usually diverge about the impact, the pace and the 
circumstances under which this expansion took place (Dunbar & Barrett 2007; Larson et al. 
2010; Fitch 2010). The idea that only around the evolution of homo sapiens full articulated 
languages took off in Africa and outside Africa turns out to be very appealing. If it was the 
case, articulated languages would have grown amidst a multifarious display of calls, objects 
and gestures, both metonymical and metaphorical, and would have been in turn fuelled by 
these rich networks of multimodal activity, as cognitive semiotics maintains (Wildgen 2004; 
Heine & Kuteva 2007; Viana 2015), and the pragmatically-based ostensive-inferential model 
has explored (Scott-Phillips 2014). It has been argued that articulated languages are a by-
product of a critical degree of brain maturation only achieved lately in the recent phases of 
human evolution (Balari & Lorenzo 2013), probably related to postfetal brain growth 
(Barbieri 2010). If it is so, the mutual involvement between the two cognitive levels, the 
antique multimodal order and the new cognitive acceleration provided by articulated voices, 
presumably produced the spread of languages around the world and the distinct and creative 
configuration we currently know, that is, a full level of symbolic activity characterised by 
unbounded interpretation (Viana 2015). 
At any rate, the imbrication between humour, laughter and human language seems non-
trivial, intriguingly elaborated during the course of evolution. Laughter accompanies 
everyday conversation and ordinary experience, as well as humour (depending, of course, on 
the usual diversity of time, place and situation). Here, it is tentatively assumed that the 
antique call of joy and play muted and diversified in different types of smile and laughter, 
adopting multiple functions through imitation processes. Humour as a cognitive dimension, 
related to incongruity and ridicule, may have evolved along these imitative and social 
procedures; and, since laughter’s respiratory patterns were conducive to assimilating laughter 
and speech, humour and laughter had presumably been rerouted to reverberate in the 
participative, figurative stages of the human mind, through joking and word playing, 
accompanying the symbolic dimension. The common approach to these topics usually comes 
from neo-Darwinian paradigms, insisting on the expected selective evolutionary pressures, 
which stress confidence and ease, the lack of inhibition and the absence of fear, an approach 
usually reinforced by both social and neuroscientific research (Ramachandran 1998; Scott et 
al. 2014). Besides these quite reliable explanations, in this paper a complementary path will 
be followed, more akin to bioanthropological and semiotic issues. 
2.2. Laughing and sobbing as ancient calls 
The continuity of emotional answers covering from nonhuman mammals to man, 
including the diversity of sounds, means and situations where they can be put to work, has 
attracted the attention of many scholars (Altenmüller et al. 2013). One common idea is that 
human bipedalism, by freeing the upper sections of the body, allowed new connections for 
the hands, new possibilities for the thorax and the arms, better relationships between 
breathing and voicing, properties that turned out to be crucial for the development of 
laughter, regarded from a coevolutionary framework (Provine 2000; 2016). In this respect, 
laughing as well as sobbing have been considered as the remnants of antique human calls, 
related to these new breathing possibilities. It has even been suggested that there might have 
existed a wider range of human calls which were lost today, after the potentialities opened by 
articulated languages (Deacon 1992). Considered in a wide sense, breathing and its variations 
are deemed as the first semi voluntary signals pretty distinctive of the human species. Shouts, 
screams, howls, yells, whistles, moans, groans, and so on, indicate the variegated meanings 
we attribute to breathing possibilities, not to mention the case of historical associations 
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created in many language families around the semantic field of breathing, associated with the 
mind, the soul or the spiritual life; and, of course, the more subtle references to whisper, 
mutter or blowing, counting all these as foundations of meaning. As Deacon (1997: 234) puts 
it, “[c]hanges in respiration patterns provide some of the most useful indices of arousal state. 
Accentuating the symptoms of respiration by making a hissing sound […] may have provided 
some of the earliest forms of vocal communication”. The growth and complexity of 
paralinguistic signals, those jointed signs which usually comprise some gesture display, a 
particular facial disposition, some voiced or unvoiced sound (i.e. the concourse of systemic 
multimodality) should have been relevant features during the many millennia that antedated 
homo sapiens.  
Laughter is not a minor issue in this respect. Interesting research has been conducted 
related to the differences between voiced and non-voiced laughter in different contexts 
(Bachorowski & Owren 2001), demonstrating that the antique breathing pattern and its 
consequences are still in use. The argument on the continuity between nonhuman mammals 
and modern humans happens to be of special interest when laughter is reckoned. As Provine 
(2000: 75-84) remarked, common primate laughter functions in the two senses, inhaling as 
well as exhaling: it consists of continuous inspire-expire bursts, more or less voiced 
according to different tones and rhythms. Human laughter, on the contrary, normally 
functions only in one way, that of exhaling. The comparison with its breathing inverted 
counterpart is meaningful: human sobbing functions by inhaling, as we all know well from 
the exaggerated sighs of children after crying. Deacon (1997: 419) described the opposite, 
complementary respiratory pattern of laughing and sobbing, remarked their emergency and 
extension during the first years of life, before full linguistic activity, and their contagiousness 
mainly in first infancy (laughter keeps being contagious during the whole adult life). These 
features qualify laughter and sobbing as manifestations of innate calls in hominids, ruled by 
early visceral control over emotions (non full-voluntary), as opposed to cortical control (full-
voluntary), as it happens to be with human speech. The most interesting question here is that 
human speech, under cortical, voluntary control, consists of exhalations, like the antique 
exhaling pattern of laughter. As Deacon (1997: 250) puts it, “although many other primate 
vocalisations also involve this in-out vocalisation pattern, […] it is indeed quite difficult and 
almost painful to speak while inhaling”. As a matter of fact, the attempt to speak while 
inhaling produces something similar to a huge emotional jerky sobbing, as we would expect 
from the old breathing patterns. Thus, the assimilation of laughter to speech, their curious 
continuity in terms of respiratory patterns, and their common outcomes in everyday 
conversation and ordinary experience form a meaningful sequence, eloquent enough of a 
possible evolutionary path. 
The continuity between nonhuman displays of joy and amusement and human emotional 
expression of laughter has been tested in different empirical studies. Davila Ross et al. (2009; 
2010; 2015) compared the acoustics of tickle-induced vocalisations in infant and juvenile 
orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos with tickle-induced laughter in human 
infants. The results provided strong evidence of the homology between both manifestations 
and supported the thesis of a phylogenetic continuity. Specifically, these results allow tracing 
the distinctive human laughter features, such as regularity, “stable voicing and consistently 
egressive airflow” (Davila Ross et al. 2009: 1106), back to characteristics of shared ancestors 
with great apes. However, the researchers also remarked that “laughter occurring in the 
common ancestor of great apes and humans was limited in usage and effect” (Davila Ross et 
al. 2010: 193). Thus, it is not only that human laughter implies voicing and egressive airflow 
direction, like linguistic activity, but the fact that whereas “apes laugh primarily in the 
contexts of social play and tickling, laughter of humans occurs across a wide range of 
contexts” (Davila Ross et al. 2010: 192). Davila Ross and her team remarked that this critical 
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expansion of uses and effects presumably took place in an intermediate stage of hominid 
evolution, maybe connected to speech-related selection, an intriguing issue that will be 
approached in the next sections. 
 Although laughter has a diversity of functions and an early evolutionary development, its 
connection with humour has historically brought about interesting reflections. Koestler’s 
(1964) memorable analysis of bisociation crucially involved an explanation seeking to 
connect bodily reactions and mental activity. His statement about humour as an “intellectual 
emotion” was driven by this tension to catch the overlapping of the physical (a reflex) and the 
intellectual (an insight). Following this line, Koestler ventured to connect laughter and 
humour with its contrary, namely weeping and pain, arguing about their inverted physical 
patterns and their opposite emotional impact. The connection extends to the inverted pattern 
they show on cognitive grounds: while weeping responds to a collapsing emotion without 
place for reasoning and rationalising, humour and laughing, on the contrary, respond to a 
collapse in reasoning and rationalising, which unleashes a pleasant emotion. Complementary 
frames of inhibition and excitement seem to be at stake in both cases; although humour is by 
far the more studied case, crying has also merited interesting research in this respect (Lutz 
1999). Inhibition and excitement, as opposed patterns, can also be related to the asymmetry 
we usually observe regarding imitation: while laughing keeps its stimulatory and imitative 
power during the whole adult life (think of sitcoms’ canned laughs), weeping seems to blur 
this property during growth (see Deacon 1997: 418-420). The asymmetry is still more 
powerful when considered in the light of human evolution: no initial, postpartum weeping has 
been described in primates (Call, J., pers. comm.), although usual play and joy vocalisations 
are common in infant and juvenile apes and human infants. This fact suggests that the initial 
crying in humans (probably related to labour pains and respiratory provisions) may be a more 
recent outcome in evolution than the ancient, playing-like vocalisations in infants and young 
people, and remind us of how these antique calls have transformed themselves by merging 
into new physical and cognitive requirements. 
2.3. The extension of Duchenne and Non-Duchenne laughter  
Here it is throughout assumed that laughter accomplishes a huge variety of functions and 
develops under many different situations and provisos, varying in intensity and intention, as 
researchers have showed (Chafe 2007). Although we are not following that line of inquiry, 
the wide spectrum of social functions that laughter covers is still interesting for our argument. 
The critical point has probably to be fixed in the distinction between Duchenne laughter and 
non-Duchenne laughter, as have been described by neuroscientists and bioanthropologists. 
Research on facial expressions led to name “Duchenne” smile the true expression of 
happiness or enjoyment, after G.-B. Duchenne de Boulogne, the first researcher to identify its 
features in the middle of the 19th century (Duchenne 1990 [1862]; Chafe 2007: 52). 
Duchenne laughter has been related to playful forms of behaviour, the laughter-evoking 
stimuli of infants, mock-aggression or tickling (a “tickling of the mind” as Darwin said), a 
sort of protohumour (Provine 2000; Darwin (2012 [1899]: 805). Non-Duchenne laughter is 
described as strategic laughter, a learned facsimile of Duchenne laughter, like the smiles and 
punctuated laughs that accompany everyday conversation (Gervais & Wilson 2005). For the 
purposes of this paper, smile and laughter will be assimilated, as we are only interested in the 
difference between spontaneous smiling and laughter, and strategic, learned and social forms 
of smiling and laughter accomplishing a variety of interaction goals. The first one is 
characterised by being emotionally-driven, involuntary (i.e. impulsive, unavoidable), while 
the second one is a volitional, non-emotional, articulated and socially-driven one. Research 
has also showed that Duchenne smile can also be faked and produced when eliciting negative 
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emotions or without positive affect (Gunnery et al. 2013; Crivelli et al. 2015), showing the 
extent of imitative processes. 
More interestingly, two partially dissociable neural pathways underlying these two 
different types of laughter have been identified (Wild et al. 2003). The first one comes from 
subcortical, limbic and brainstem areas, while the second one is a voluntary motor pattern 
that originates in the brain’s frontal premotor areas. Wild et al. (2003: 2128-2129) have found 
support for this distribution in two types of facial paralysis, one leaving volitionally mimic 
laughter intact and the other one leaving spontaneous laughter responses to nonserious 
incongruities intact. As it seems, involuntary and voluntary types of laughter are then related 
to separate pathways for facial expressions and arise from separate neural systems, which 
presumably evolved in different periods: while the spontaneous, tickling type connects with 
old primate and ape behaviours and therefore responds to play and mirth, the volitional, more 
conversational type would be a more recent acquisition related to social abilities, 
conversational control, disparagement or derision (Gervais & Wilson 2005). 
Recent research has ventured on empirical work to explore the possible acoustic and 
perceptual differences between spontaneous and volitional laughter, also showing that 
spontaneous laughter shares features with nonhuman animal vocalizations while volitional 
laughter does not (Bryant & Aktipis 2014). At any rate, two different provisos should be 
made, regarding this crucial distribution: on the one hand, the extension of uses and effects of 
spontaneous Duchenne laughter is a product of both biological and social evolution and thus, 
it has been transformed and modified by mirror matching systems in the brain and the 
development of empathy (and a theory of mind) during social cooperation (Gervais & Wilson 
2005: 415); on the other hand, volitional, motor-driven non-Duchenne laughter has achieved 
a degree of automaticity, as is the case with natural linguistic abilities; then, although it is 
strategic, learned and it can be imitated, it seems to occur largely beyond conscious control 
(Gervais & Wilson 2005: 401).  
For the purposes of this paper, the main interesting points of discussion are their timing 
of emergence and the continuity hypothesis. It seems proved that spontaneous laughter, 
linked to “protohumour” including rough-and-tumble play, tickling, physical mishaps or 
pleasant surprises, has its origins in primate social play. Ritualisation and social contagion in 
safe and rich multimodal and prelinguistic domains of activity may have led to extend its 
adaptive value, connected to a diversity of social functions by reinforcing cohesiveness and 
cooperation (Weisfeld 1993; Gervais & Wilson 2005; Scott et al. 2014). Thus, the ancient 
nonhuman call would have gained uses and effects by joining to new behaviours, abilities and 
activities beyond its limited original range of play and mirth. Extended imitation has probably 
had a crucial role in this behavioural expansion. For Gervais & Wilson (2005), both 
conversational, non-Duchenne laughter and preverbal humour would have emerged as 
modifications from this old, extended pattern: 
This means that Duchenne laughter and protohumour would have been present in the prehuman 
behavioural repertoire as various advances were made in successive species, including the 
evolution of volitional oral-facial muscle control, the invention of material and cultural artefacts, 
language, the evolution of a Homo sapiens-level Theory of Mind, and the emergence of fully 
modern humans […]. We propose that it is from this process that non-Duchenne laughter arose  
(Gervais & Wilson 2005: 418). 
The modern, social and persuasive non-Duchenne laughter would then be connected to the 
mental and critical control of the social context, and probably to much more aggressive or 
derisive uses, due to better mind-reading abilities. The role of joint attention in evolution and 
the development of extended empathy (and a theory of mind), as posited by Tomasello (2008; 
2014), would have contributed to the integration and modification of theses abilities. Socially 
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spread forms of imitation, again, seem to be the right cue, as conversational smiling and 
punctuation giggles and sniggers, being actions able to be feigned, play their adaptive roles 
and their critical functions in social interaction. Research on behavioural alignment and 
synchrony (Manson et al. 2013; Finset 2014; Eaves et al. 2016) also reinforces the idea of 
social adaptation through multimodal signals, where those evolutionary and functionally 
transformed smiles and laughs find their place. 
This long and complex coevolutionary process tallies with the suggested social and 
contextual emergence of human signing described by Dunbar (1996; 2004; 2013; 2016), 
when he explores how multimodal activity (grooming and variations about human haptic 
evolution) might have been a right environment for the transformation of laughing amidst 
more dynamic group activities, and thus providing a rich and safe ground for human 
communication to develop. As he puts it, and contrary to usual perception, everyday, 
common conversation would be a fair background for smiles and laughs (Dunbar 2004) and 
not the other way around, since smiles and laughs are forms of contact that pragmatically 
assure group bonding and solidarity, as well as discipline (when needed; or, alternatively, 
rebellion), among other functions. This seems an anthropologically appropriate account of the 
association between the old multimodal signals and the rather emergent articulated 
potentialities. 
In this regard, elementary forms of humour may have emerged well before articulated 
languages, being displayed through incongruence and ridicule, conveyed by laughs and 
smiles as evolved forms of social alignment, imitation and group adaptation. As stated above, 
Scott-Phillips’ (2014) ostensive-inferential model of integrating multimodality and intentions, 
applied to the evolution of the social mind and crucially relying on the expression and 
recognition of intentions (and then, in the development of a theory of mind), represents a 
consistent pragmatically-based framework for our argument, i.e. the attempt to explain the 
presumably early expansion and diversification of laughter and humour. As for cognition and 
articulated language, positive co-optation may also have been the rule: 
In this scenario language and humour would no doubt have coevolved to some extent, with 
language and speakers becoming more adept at eliciting laughter and the laughter mechanism 
becoming more susceptible to conceptual triggering. But […] only the original properties of 
Duchenne laughter would have allowed it to be evolutionarily harnessed by language. Only 
insofar as language was able to conform to the structure of the already established elicitor of 
laughter could it trigger the laughter response. 
(Gervais & Wilson 2005: 419) 
And yet the cognitive aspects of humour seem to be the most difficult to explore on natural 
basis. While it has been quite well established that the extension of uses and effects of 
laughter may have contributed to their actual multifunctionality in social contexts, the 
emergence of articulated languages, even if it happened in parallel to multimodal activity, 
poses new problems of coherence and comprehension. As Gervais & Wilson point out (2005: 
420), the new mental abilities had to match “the potential of language to represent nonserious 
social incongruity and the affective properties of laughter that constituted its functional 
potential”, in order for us to understand the “variety of forms and functions that characterise 
laughter today”. Then, in the following section, we approach the social and the cognitive (or 
rather semiotic) aspects presumably involved in the emergence of verbal humour. 
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3. Social and cognitive issues 
3.1. Human laughter helps define social groups 
Current research usually assumes the beneficial and cooperative functions of laughter 
(and humour) in the course of human evolution, its glue character to creating bonds and 
maintaining relationships (Deacon 1997; Gervais & Wilson 2005; Dunbar 2013; Scott et al. 
2014). But its non-affiliative, aggressive or critical side has been less explored and less 
theorised in this respect. An interesting exception is Billig (2005), who considers both the 
disciplinary and the rebellious sides of humour and laughter in social relationships. Rebellion 
and discipline are, of course, opposed and complementary sides of social regulations. Billig 
refuses the current trend of considering mainly the beneficial (so called “positive”) aspects of 
humour. His research stems from social psychology, and it aims to present ridicule and 
embarrassment as the less explored effects and consequences that humour and laughter 
trigger in social interaction. Instead of focusing in abstract, non-engaged definitions of 
humour as incongruity or frame collapse, Billig insists on the links humour and laughter 
weave with social differences, rules and interdictions. Thus, two different sides of the process 
emerge to explain ridicule and embarrassment: their active, sanction-like potential, conveyed 
by disciplinary mocking, where the butt of the jokes or the target of the pranks have a lesson 
to learn; and their opposite, overtly critical counterpart conveyed by rebellious mocking, 
where somebody reacts again an oppressive or discouraging rule, by putting it into question. 
Both complementary sides described by Billig depart from the positive mode of humour 
commented in the literature, which emphasises the well-being, solidarity bonds and affective 
properties. Critical arguments about the social uses of humour, its value to discriminate, to 
build and reinforce social and cultural stereotypes, to criticise social or ethnic groups, have 
also been profitably put under scrutiny in the sociological literature (Davies 1998; Kuipers 
2015). 
Billig’s (2005) research leads us to speculate about how humour and laughter can be 
related to the origins of social rules. Discipline and rebellion are the true marks of social 
organisation. As Billig argues, both sides are present in the making of ridicule. Both 
participate in the construction and reconstruction of sanctions. And yet, at any rate, it will be 
a mistake to concentrate only in the disciplinary (or the rebellious) side, setting aside the 
bonding effects of humour and laughing. Discourse analysis has fruitfully shown how 
humour effectively works both on bonding (by creating solidarity) as well as on discipline (or 
its contrary, rebellion; see among others Holmes & Stubbe 2015). The bonding dimension 
builds the ingroup domain, while disciplinary and rebellious attitudes work on an outgroup 
basis, signalling actual or potential opponents or rivals. Both dimensions, then (i.e. the 
ingroup functions of solidarity and security and the outgroup functions of sanctioning 
divergence or abuse) appear strictly complementary, and seem necessary for humour and 
laughter to emerge (cf. Martin 2007: 210-225). Then, it makes sense to hold that both 
sanction and solidarity are at the origins of social rules. Discipline or rebellion, and their 
opposite, bond and solidarity, mark what social rules are and how they work. Laughter should 
have played a role in informal, prelinguistic environment in this sense, as it still does today in 
pair with linguistic activity. The extension of uses and effects of laughter we have been 
considering here would be mainly related to these emerging functions.  
Lastly, one should be tempted to connect the ancient call of laughter assuming these new 
rich and social functions to the complementary (and recessive) reflex of blushing, as 
described by Darwin (2012 [1899]), the bodily sign for embarrassment, which may be 
associated to the origins of a developed empathy and a theory of mind. This is a step that 
Billig, despite his interest in embarrassment and social rules, does not overtly take (although 
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he refers to it; see Billig 2005: 221), but it is a connection that could be interesting to explore, 
since both laughter (through ridicule) and blushing (through shame) are connected to forms 
of embarrassment that more or less manifest the social order, how it works and what its right 
settings are. As a matter of fact, both laughter and blushing are ancient bodily marks crucially 
related to the evolution of the social mind, and at the end of the nineteenth century both 
reflexes captured the interest of Darwin (2012 [1899]), as embodied emotions. 
3.2. Humour feeds verbal communication 
Conversation analysis has shown the pervasiveness of humour and jokes in everyday, 
common interaction and their polyphonic functions (Norrick 1993; Priego-Valverde 2003). 
Wordplay is not an exception in this context but the normal case, as the research shows. 
Speakers use everyday language in an easy-going way and a relaxed attitude, ready to twist 
meanings, play with similar forms or retort with non-perfectly coherent answers. Absolute 
logic does not command common, everyday interaction in its minor, routine-like details. The 
attachment of humour and play to everyday conversational interaction is a solid and powerful 
condition. Conversation, under this view, should be considered as a basic and substantial 
form of interaction, where multimodality still plays a determining role. That’s why adaptation 
and cooperation have been described as important features of conversation from an 
evolutionary point of view (Dunbar 2004; Manson et al. 2013), even when joking is 
considered (Dunbar 2016). In this sense, linguistic activity is inescapably social (there are no 
individual languages), a property that has also been attributed to humour and laughing 
(Gervais & Wilson 2005).  
Even in its common manifestations, humour is related to language by a multiplicity of 
procedures (Nash 1985). And yet it is not only the case that humour possibilities have 
permeated the whole structure of language and hold connections with creativity and 
expression, but the fact that humour potential has been developed into different literary, 
imaginative genres over the course of history and literary history. This should be viewed as a 
very strange situation, with few equivalents in other domains: an ancient sign that adheres to 
the rather new, symbolic (i.e. articulated) order of expression, and rises to elaborated 
cognitive forms that mutate and adapt (as literature had also done) into new, accepted forms 
of play, mirth and criticism; not to mention jokes, the old humorous genre by excellence, a 
vehicle for transmission of cultural contents with many familiar links with narrativity 
(Attardo 2001). 
To be sure, humour plays an interesting role in a fair variety of semiotic and cultural 
domains. Deacon (1997: 420) argued that the connection between laughter and humour could 
be “a side effect of the adaptation for symbol learning”. A definitory fact of symbolic activity 
is that interpretation always involves more than understanding what is said. In this respect, 
interpreting jokes entails “simultaneously to entertain inconsistent alternative perspectives 
extrapolated from the same initial context” (Deacon 1997: 420). And it is a fact that, in 
everyday communication, we must choose, from a chaotic and excessive ground, which 
figures fit our purposes, and so, as Bergson (1900) said, we are always close to discovering 
the mechanical (i.e. the unintended) embedded in the animate (i.e. the purposeful). From 
Koestler (1964) on, we know that insight and surprise are critical components of humour. In 
Deacon’s argument, insight and surprise crucially “implicate prefrontal functions that enable 
mutually exclusive associations to be juxtaposed”; and perhaps the unleashing of laughter, 
“like the sudden disinhibition of a suppressed automatic response, reflects the disengaging of 
prefrontal control” (Deacon 1997: 421).  
The question can be rephrased as follows: The wide connectivity opened by the 
emergence of articulated languages and the spread of full symbolic activity entails 
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interpretive complexity. Symbolic meanings do not boil down to mere exchanges but involve 
a work of selection (and substitution) and combination (and contextualisation). From this 
background of associative order and unbounded connectivity, our words and social meanings 
emerge and take shape. When inordinate associations suddenly emerge beyond our 
monitoring, cortical control yields ground to the emotional, reflex response of laughter. This 
may be an acceptable statement to grasp the coevolution of cognition, humour, and its ancient 
and partially convergent embodied sign, laughter.  
It is our contention that, when the expanded human symbolic abilities came into scene, 
the previous social potential of humour and laughter, fuelled by incongruity and ridicule, was 
presumably readjusted (rewired, rerouted), in order to signal outbreaks of unlimited 
connectivity at the cognitive level. This early attachment would have sustained and fed new 
associations in turn, and, in a typical recursive way, would have produced and recreated the 
rich combinations we currently observe across a diversity of semiotic and cultural genres 
where humour finds its place. If language and reason allow us to have some distance from 
sudden emotions, the stereotypical reflex brought us back to the breeding ground of multiple 
associations and unlimited connectivity, always latent and necessary for cognition. 
3.3. Connectivity by means of contact and similitude 
Extended brain connectivity joined to long-distance neural associations have been 
usually deemed particular properties of the homo sapiens’ cognitive evolution, sometimes 
referred to as hyperconnectivity (Edelman 2005; Balari & Lorenzo 2013). The interesting 
question for our argument is that connectivity is grounded on interwoven relationships that 
assure unbounded interpretation, this being the matrix of symbolic activity. As cognitive 
semiotics maintains (Schilhab et al. 2012), mental activity can be described in terms of signs, 
of full semiotic complex interactions. This approach in terms of semiotic relationships has a 
long history: it can be retraced to ancient rhetorical patterns, where verbal and nonverbal 
associations had been fruitfully explored in different pragmatic and persuasive settings. The 
tradition of association types continues to John Locke (1632-1704) and David Hume (1711-
1776), and was rediscovered by modern scholars as a solid background of cultural meanings 
(Leach 1976). We usually say that there are associations in the code (by similitude) as 
opposed to associations in the message (by contact), and, moreover, we can build 
relationships from the code to the message (wording; verbal) as well as the opposite, from the 
message to the code (decoding; conceptual). Similitude and contact, respectively, are the 
foundation of common tropes, metaphor and metonymy; wording and decoding, likewise, 
were the foundation of figures, verbal and nonverbal, in the rhetorical parlance. As Attardo 
(1994) notes, Cicero (106 BC-46 BC) was probably the first scholar to locate humour and 
jokes (facetiae) among those types of associations. Probably unaware of the Ciceronian 
division between verbal and nonverbal jokes (as well as those built by similitude and those 
built by contact), Freud (1960 [1905]) engaged himself in a similar but also productive 
multiclassification of humour and jokes, which allowed tracing them back to dreaming 
activity, and thus indirectly showing the relevance of the ancient rhetorical (or semiotic) 
pattern. 
Thus, contact and similitude, as well as verbal and referential (or conceptual) 
associations, have been reported as the framework of unconscious activity, and the 
background of verbal and nonverbal conscious symbolic work. Here is where we find humour 
as the unleashing of this fruitful connectivity. Contact and similitude, as well as metaphor and 
metonymy (Trim 2007), are the breeding ground of symbolic activity at cognitive and 
linguistic levels. On the one hand, contact or contiguity are the base for indexical solutions; 
on the other hand, similitude or resemblance are the foundation of iconic relationships, in 
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semiotic terms (Viana 2015). Notice that humour pulls out its automatic, reflex bisociations 
(to use Koestler’s term; Koestler, 1964: 35-36) from resemblances and contiguities, both 
verbal and nonverbal. The resulting, numberless variations in humorous typology ultimately 
stem from this particular attachment to the quadripartite matrix of contact and similitude, 
verbal and nonverbal, and are fuelled by it, as the early semiotic study of Milner (1972) 
usefully showed. In parallel to dreaming activity or figurative thinking, humour works on the 
spontaneous region of unbounded relationships, usually seen as the background of more 
conscious, methodical and purposeful cognitive operations. Considering this rich and 
productive process of symbolic associations, these arguments bring back humour to the 
origins of the extended connectivity that distinguishes our species, and to the way the old 
signs of play, social discrimination, ridicule and incongruity may have been readapted to 
match the increase of cortical control over conscious cognitive production, by signalling 
spontaneous, unrestrained relations. The connection between unlimited associations in the 
symbolic domain (i.e. incongruity or bisociation) and the ancient reflex of laughter speaks in 
favour of the fact that we are in front of very old evolutionary processes presumably related, 
as Deacon (1997: 420-421) suggested, to the development of full levels of symbolic activity 
characterised by unbounded interpretation. 
4. Humour and laughter point the way to the imaginative function of the 
ancient mind 
The idea of vestiges (lat. vestigium, footprint) has been very powerful in natural sciences 
(Donald 2002). It is of use today in astrophysics, where galaxies are measured by their 
distance in time from an original point. Vestiges, of course, are fully operative in many 
scholarly domains, and we should esteem their actual power in addition to their history and 
their primeval functions. In this paper, it is argued that humour and laughter may be 
interestingly regarded, from the point of view of their evolutionary history, as vestiges of 
hominisation processes. Indeed, some effort has been devoted to attributing a place to 
humour in the evolutionary stages that brought forth the human mind, by asserting its 
survival properties under a generalised framework that assumes the rational nature of 
cognitive activity and its computer-like performance. Consequently, it is argued, humour as a 
surviving device aptly matches these rationality-oriented properties (Hurley et al. 2011). In 
this paper we attempt to depart from a narrow-minded version of rationality and look for a 
complementary, more comprehensive account of the origins of the mind, by setting us in a 
cognitive and pragmatic perspective (Donald 1991; Mithen 1996). 
In this regard, we can fruitfully use the amount of research that has been produced about 
humour, literature and creativity. Literature is part of our rationality, as humour is; both 
represent the qualities of order and meaning, acquired by different methods than those used in 
algorithmic, controlled cognitive procedures. In Bateson’s (1972; 1979) early cognitive 
semiotics, it is remarked that dreaming, original myth-telling, social play and fantasy might 
have bolstered human evolution and may be seen as archaic ways to convey dimensions that 
we explore today under artistic forms such as dance, music or theatre. More specifically, play 
and fantasy should have had an innovative role in the cognitive and pragmatic development 
of the human mind. Thus, it has been argued that our persistent use of a moderated creativity 
during the whole adult life is a juvenile remnant of human evolution that has indeed lingered 
on over the years, an intriguing feature without correspondence in nonhuman mammal 
environment (Montagu 1981). Thus, Bateson (1985) did not hesitate to include joking and 
humour among those early capacities that brought forth a new flexibility for human thought. 
Dreaming is still with us as a necessary built-in process, required for (and complementary to) 
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our everyday cognitive abilities (States 1993). Storytelling has developed in the multiple 
forms literature and art have to evoke meanings, values and experiences. And, as we have 
seen, humour has clung to elaborate cognitive processes and has spread over a diversity of 
domains, keeping its paradoxical character of signalling the unlimited associative capacity. 
There has also been interesting research aligning humour with the paradoxes and 
uncertainties of literature, without overlooking the evolutionary origins (Gutwirth 1993; 
Berger 2014). From anthropology, the idea of the social celebration of absurdities and the 
emergence of comic rituals has also been explored, as well as the proximity of humour with 
metaphor and creativity (Douglas 1975b). Even from the field of literary criticism, the idea 
that verbal invention (i.e. puns and wordplay) unleashes humour, being at the same time one 
of the original pillars of literary production, has merited a certain attention (Culler 1988). 
Koestler (1964) built an interesting comparative relation between three different cognitive 
fields where creativity was at stake, namely science, humour and art, in a research that can 
subsume the efforts to offering a wide version of rationality, where non-algorithmic, 
unlimited and open associative procedures are welcome. 
For cognitive semiotics, the mind is a construct that constructs itself by doing things 
(Danesi 1993; Donald 2002; Schilhab et al. 2012). Among its forming properties, creative 
imagination has been considered a fundamental one. Figurative thinking was essential for the 
birth of cults and rituals, at the beginning of homo sapiens, then giving way to ancient 
religions. The faces we still see in the clouds are the best vestiges of humanisation (Guthrie 
1993), a process that led to project in nature our own experience and human body features, by 
means of imagining animated properties. Dreaming, the discovery of objects proper to us (i.e. 
things), wide naming processes, (un)purposeful projections and fears, all that array of activity 
constitutes the original material of figurative work, the cradle of thinking. Participation is 
also a word that has been used to describe this early but still-in-use stage of the mind 
(Barfield 1988), where the universe is not yet something “out there” but a consistent 
continuity between our thoughts, observed processes and fantasies. A mess of indexicality 
and iconicity, of contamination and likeness, where language and pragmatic action were not 
missing, would be the right background for a participative scenario. We should not elude the 
proper linguistic contribution to these issues, because we know that ritual, magic spells and 
sorcery were at the back of early uses of words and concepts. In its true core, language is a 
sediment of anthropomorphisms, a network of indexical and iconic projections (Cassirer 
1955). Figurativeness is the outcome of this associative work, and from this context of 
extended connectivity we tentatively assume that humour found its place as a powerful signal 
of the outburst of unlimited associations, largely connected to affiliative as well as 
disciplinary social functions. 
Writing about art and emotion, Cassirer (1944: 150) pointed out that comic art possessed 
“in the highest degree that faculty shared by all art, sympathetic vision”. We should read the 
phrase “sympathetic vision” along the lines of participation and enchantment. As creditable 
defenders of positive and beneficial humour maintain, insisting in the creative and rich power 
of bisociation, humour aligns itself with illusion, fantasy, and emotive participation (Fry 
1963; Berger 2014). It reminds us of this world upside down, replete of mixed properties 
where horses master rhetorical devices, partition walls start flying or ravens have three legs. 
In a parallel way to emotive participation, humour and jokes do not distinguish between inner 
and outer properties, space and time as a priori forms, or well established linguistic 
paradigms. Playing with those categories, humour and jokes seem to evoke the old property 
of utterances to lure and captivate by means of fantastic and imaginative classifications, and 
this is what participation is about, that is its proper parlance. As far as figurative thinking had 
apparently been the original form the human mind embraced in order to build meaning by 
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means of participative plots and projections, humour as a way to underscore the domain of 
boundless associations may have fed this scenario. 
A nice reasoning by Kant (1914 [1790]) would help us strengthen our case. Besides his 
well-known and often quoted assertion that laughter “is an affection arising from the sudden 
transformation of a strained expectation into nothing,” Kant (1914 [1790]: 222) affirmed that 
always “there must be something absurd (in which the Understanding, therefore, can find no 
satisfaction).” The German philosopher resorted to non-solved incongruity in order to align 
humour with spotless incomprehension. He overall contends that the act of understanding lies 
at the opposite pole of humour and laughter. Thus, he grouped together “music and that 
which excites laughter” (as two different kinds of play with aesthetical ideas), “through 
which ultimately nothing is thought” (Kant 1914 [1790]: 223). Music and humour, then, 
would be pleasures that may be enjoyed without content. Coming from a sheer rationalist, 
this statement merits to be taken into consideration. If we pay attention to the contrast and 
oppositeness between humour and understanding, the former may be more easily ascribed to 
the functions of the primitive mind. Its alliance with emotions, as is also the case with music 
(and singing), lets us classify them as early forms of order and social significance. We could 
say that both are ways of understanding without understanding, ways of conveying social 
meanings that eschew rational content. Following this trend of reasoning, we could also 
regard humour as a direct challenge to the famous first sentence of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: 
“All men naturally desire knowledge” (Aristotle 1933-1989: 1980a). Humour both celebrates 
and questions Aristotle’s statement. And that is understandable from an evolutionary point of 
view, if humour is a signal of the haul of evolution of human language and mind. 
Our last issue deals with embodiment. As we have argued, laughter presumably 
preceded articulated linguistic activity, although its functions have kept expanding for 
thousands of years. Humour and its partially convergent evolutionary counterpart, laughter, 
are bodily manifestations of the “sympathetic” mode of the mind, to say it à la Cassirer. 
Thus, the issue of embodiment is not a minor one, and this connection has amazed scholars 
from the very beginning of humour inquiries. Even Kant argued that laughter as bodily 
manifestation (“the movement of the organs of the body”) was caused by the non-
understandable and yet enjoyable transformation that humour consists of (“the sudden 
transposition of the mind”, Kant 1914 [1790]: 226). But the embodiment that humour and 
laughter exhibit carries its own evolutionary history. Douglas (1975a), while exploring the 
playful character of laughter already present in nonhuman mammal environments, considered 
its bodily basis. For human contexts, she postulated a rule of coherence between humour, 
body and the social order, involving these three levels to get the right, mirthful inversion that 
humour implies (for a pragmatic approach to the coherence rule, see Viana 2006). As noted 
above, this connection may be viewed as a piece of evidence of its ancient origins, as the 
laughter reflex was imprinted in the old physical networks that compound body and thought, 
presumably creating the most conspicuous and intriguing feature of the participative mind. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, humour and laughter have been presented as vestiges of the evolution of human 
language and mind. Firstly, it has been argued that multimodality (through gestural, facial 
and vocal signs) presumably preceded in evolutionary history articulated languages. 
Secondly, the question of the continuity between human laughter and nonhuman mammal 
vocalisations has been consequently raised. It has been maintained that human laughter 
shows a clear continuity with nonhuman mammal vocal expressions, and we have inquired 
about the issue of bipedalism and how it should have influenced the development of 
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specifically human laughter features, from the point of view of breathing possibilities as well 
as those of the arrival of new multimodal human signs. 
The contentions of this paper include that the proposed continuity between nonhuman 
mammal vocalisations and human laughter had two meaningful turning points, from which 
their similitudes depart and continuity transforms itself. Firstly, we should consider the 
extension of uses and effects of laughter via neural imitation procedures, social alignment, 
and the development of a theory of mind, probably during an evolutionary intermediate 
period before the appearance of homo sapiens. This extension of uses and effects includes the 
divide between Duchenne and non-Duchenne laughter and, presumably, the emergence of 
preverbal humour enabled by ridicule and incongruity. Secondly, we should take into account 
the developmental extension favoured by the late and impressive cognitive acceleration 
brought forth by the emergence of articulated languages. In this new context, both the ancient 
reflex and the alleged forms of preverbal humour had presumably been readapted to match 
the new demands of symbolic thinking.  
Thus, we tentatively hypothesise that this adjustment happened under two interesting and 
complementary conditions: a) the polarity of social functions, by the increasing conjoined 
work of sanction and solidarity; and b) the extended connectivity that distinguishes our 
species at the cognitive level, working on figurative (metaphorical and metonymical) basis, 
sustaining from its inception the imaginative functions of the primitive mind. Then, when the 
expanded human symbolic abilities came into scene, the previous social potential of humour 
and laughter, fuelled by incongruity and ridicule, may have been rearranged to signal 
outbreaks of unlimited associations, largely related to affiliative as well as disciplinary social 
functions, and still eliciting an unintended bodily response.  
As we have seen, both humour and laughter diversified their functions in the course of 
evolution, but they crucially readapted to figurativeness, as an emergent property of the mind, 
by underscoring the spontaneous, unrestrained associative capacity, at the time when full 
levels of symbolic activity unfolded, characterised by unbounded interpretation. If this was 
so, then humour, fuelled by language, may be seen as an embodied sign for the imaginative 
function of the mind, and one particularly attuned to the improvement of human social and 
cognitive abilities. Nevertheless, we are aware that the hypothesis championed here has to be 
provisionally taken, until converging evidence from other sources can be found, in order to 
achieve a sound result on the evolutionary paths of laughter and humour.  
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